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doi:10.1016/j.iimb.2011.03.002Abstract Major concerns, both theoretical and methodological, have been raised about the
adequacy of the leader-member exchange (LMX) theory, the existing model on supervisore
subordinate exchanges. This paper seeks to overcome three main theoretical shortcomings
of the LMX theory as documented in past research. First, that the LMX theory does not describe
the exchange process sufficiently, and second, that it does not capture the cross-cultural influ-
ences on supervisoresubordinate exchanges. This paper deals with these weaknesses by
providing a comprehensive description of supervisoresubordinate exchanges across cultures
using two theoretical frameworks, Fiske’s relational theory and Triandis’s cultural syndromes.
A third problem with the LMX theory is that it assumes all close relationships between super-
visors and subordinates to be beneficial for the organisation. However, a stream of research
has emerged that documents the downside of close relationships between supervisors and
their subordinates. Utilising a recent cross-cultural framework on cronyism, this paper sheds
light on the dysfunctional organisational consequences of close relationships between supervi-
sors and their subordinates across cultures.
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issouri.edu.
Management Bangalore. All
ponsibility of Indian InstituteSchriesheim, Castro, and Cogliser (1999) concluded that
‘current LMX theory lacks a clear description of the
exchange process between a leader and subordinate’
(p.101) and ‘there has not been a clear development and
refinement of the theory over time’ (p.65). The super-
visoresubordinate exchanges are far more complex than
assumed in the theory and as such we sorely need to rec-
onceptualise it (Yukl, 2006). This paper provides new
theoretical insights into the supervisoresubordinate
exchanges by incorporating Fiske’s relational models.
Second, the LMX theory is woefully inadequate in
capturing the richness of supervisoresubordinate
exchanges across cultures (House, Javidan, Dorfman, &
Sully de Luque, 2006). The appropriate approach may be
to develop culture-specific models and measures of super-
visoresubordinate exchanges. Already, such efforts are
under way. For example, several Chinese scholars (Altman,
Bournois, Rojot, & Han, 2008; Chen, Friedman, Yu, Fang, &
72 N. KhatriLu, 2008; Law, Wong, Wang, & Wang, 2000) have developed
and tested models of supervisoresubordinate guanxi. More
research of this kind will go a long way in enriching the
theoretical underpinnings of supervisoresubordinate
exchanges across cultures. This paper provides a rudimen-
tary description of how supervisoresubordinate exchanges
may vary across the cultural syndromes of vertical-collec-
tivism, vertical-individualism, horizontal-collectivism, and
horizontal-individualism that can form the basis of future
empirical research.
Third, the proponents of LMX theory seem to downplay
the dysfunctional organisational consequences of the close
relationships between supervisors and their subordinates.
However, numerous studies have shown that the downside
of close relationships is considerable and cannot be over-
looked (e.g., Deluga & Perry, 1994; Green, Anderson, &
Shivers, 1996; Judge & Ferris, 1993; Prendergast & Topel,
1996; Yu & Liang, 2004, and numerous others). Given that
such a large number of studies in the past have reported
adverse consequences arising from close super-
visoresubordinate relationships, it would seem improper to
treat them as anomalies; the accumulated findings from
these studies call for a theoretical explanation. This paper
provides a framework around the concept of cronyism
proposed by Khatri, Tsang, and Begley (2006) to explain the
dark side of close supervisoresubordinate exchanges. In
these exchanges, supervisors and subordinates advance
each other’s interests but in the process hurt organisational
outcomes because doing so results in inefficiencies and
distortions in management practices and reward systems.
Fiske’s relational theory and Triandis’s cultural
syndromes are discussed briefly next as they form the core
of this paper. This discussion is followed by an explication
of the taxonomy of supervisoresubordinate exchanges
across cultures.
Fiske’s relational models as basic forms of
social exchanges
Fiske’s relational theory consisting of the four elementary
relationships has drawn comparisons to Marx and Freud for
its breadth and elegance (Sullivan, 2005). Since its
promulgation in 1991, it has received support from
numerous empirical studies (for a review see Haslam,
2004). Fiske (1991, 1992) proposed a set of four elemen-
tary relational models that people use when they think
about social interaction: communal sharing, authority
ranking, equality matching, and market pricing. In
communal sharing, group members are entitled to share
resources according to need. Since the basic desire of
members is to belong and be the same, they emphasise
harmonious relations based on intimacy, nurturance,
altruism, caring, selflessness, generosity, sharing, and
concern for others. In authority ranking, resources are
divided according to rank, the self is either exalted or
humbled, and inequality is natural. Authority ranking
emphasises respect, deference, loyalty, and obedience,
with punishment for the impertinent. In equality matching,
resources and work are shared equally, justice means
equality, reciprocity in kind is very important, and the self
is like every other self. The basic motivation is to achievean even balance. Finally, in market pricing, each person
receives resources commensurate with his or her contri-
butions e the more you give, the more you get. Social
relations are analysed according to a calculus of profit and
loss, gifts are given according to previous contributions to
the relationship, and achievement is important.
Fiske (1991, 1992) has shown that the relational models
theory represents cultural universals and applies within and
across cultures. It is a parsimonious explanation of social
exchanges in that it not only captures what previous
approaches on social and economic exchanges can explain,
but it also suggests additional mechanisms to explain social
relations. For example, Fiske’s relational model of
communal sharing encompasses the self-categorisation
theory, which like communal sharing, divides people’s
social worlds into distinct equivalence classes based on
individual attributes: people who share one’s equivalence
classes are viewed as more positive than people who do not
share one’s equivalence (Hogg & Terry, 2000). Fiske’s
market pricing model captures what underlies a number of
theories frequently used in organisational research, for
example transaction cost economics, motivation theories,
and compensation/reward systems (Chen, Peng, &
Saparito, 2002). Further, Fiske’s relational theory enriches
our understanding of social exchanges by proposing
authority ranking and equality matching, two additional
ways in which members of a society or culture may engage
in social exchanges.
The range of phenomena that the relational models
theory has been used to explain is very extensive, ranging
widely over individual and collective levels, from cognitive
psychology to organisational behaviour, and from relation-
ships between multinational corporations to the Oedipus
complex (Haslam, 2004). The diversity of the applications
of the relational models theory points toward its versatility.Triandis’s cultural syndromes
Since Triandis and colleagues (Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, &
Gelfand, 1995; Triandis, 1995; 1996; Triandis & Gelfand,
1998) first proposed the idea, research on vertical and
horizontal-individualism and collectivism in various
research domains has mushroomed. Singelis et al. (1995)
made both theoretical and empirical distinctions between
vertical and horizontal-individualism and collectivism and
demonstrated that measuring vertical-collectivism (VeC),
vertical-individualism (VeI), horizontal-collectivism (HeC),
and horizontal-individualism (HeI) is more desirable than
measuring either the more abstract constructs of individu-
alism and collectivism, or the constituent elements of these
constructs, such as self-reliance, hedonism, and family
integrity. In HeI cultural pattern, the individual is inde-
pendent and more or less equal in status with others.
Individuals thus want to be distinct from groups and self-
reliant, but they are not particularly interested in achieving
higher status than others. Individuals in a VeI cultural
pattern see each other as different, and inequality is
expected. Members behave as independent actors that
compete with others for status. Members in a HeC cultural
pattern see themselves as part of an in-group. In other
words, the self is merged with the members of the in-group,
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experience a sense of social cohesion and oneness. VeC is
a cultural pattern in which the individual sees the self as an
aspect of an in-group, but the members of the in-group are
different from each other, some having more status than
others. Serving and sacrificing for the in-group is an
important aspect of this pattern.
In the last few years, several researchers (e.g.,
Kemmelmeier et al., 2003; Nelson & Shavitt, 2002; Shavitt,
Lalwani, Zhang, & Torelli, 2006; Thomas & Au, 2002) have
confirmed Singelis et al.’s (1995) notion that the cultural
matrix of individualismecollectivism (I/C) with verti-
calnessehorizontalness (V/H) adds significant explanatory
value. For example, Nelson and Shavitt (2002) attributed
differences between Denmark and the United States, two
individualist cultures, to their divergent positions on the V/
H axis. Since Americans value rank and status more highly
than Danes, they place greater emphasis on goal achieve-
ment. Kemmelmeier et al.’s (2003) seven-country study
provided greater discrimination than previously existed
when it reported that authoritarianism varied along V/H
while social dominance varied along I/C. Shavitt et al.
(2006) presented evidence from several studies showing
V/H distinction as a predictor of new consumer psychology
phenomena not anticipated by a broader focus on I/C.
Koerner and Fujiwara (2000) found I/C alone as incomplete
description of culture, but noticed a dramatic increase in
its explanatory power with the addition of V/H cultural
orientation. The V/H cultural orientation that has been
suggested by Thomas and Au (2002) is of particular impor-
tance in understanding the exchange relationships between
members, which is the focus of this paper.
A cross-cultural typology of supervisore
subordinate exchanges
The leaderefollower exchange prototypes and employees’
work-related scripts are shown to be affected by cultural
and sub-cultural variables (Stone-Romero, Stone, & Salas,
2003). Euwema, Wendt, and Emmerik (2007) found that
the effects of some leader behaviours are universal, while
the effects of others are strongly moderated by culture.
Specifically, the authors found that the positive effect of
supportive leadership on group phenomena was less
culturally bound, but the negative effect of directive
leadership was moderated by culture such that it was much
more negative in an individualist culture than a collectivist
culture. Thus, it seems that scholars need to first test the
fit of basic assumptions underlying supervisoresubordinate
exchanges in cultures other than the United States before
moving on to later stages in theorising about the nature
of supervisoresubordinate exchanges (House, Hanges,
Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004; Pellegrini & Scandura,
2006; Shavitt et al., 2006).
Triandis and collaborators (Singelis et al., 1995; Triandis,
1995; 1996; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998) were among the
earliest scholars suggesting a correspondence or similarity
or connection between Triandis’s cultural syndromes and
Fiske’s relational models. Singelis et al. (1995) noted that
the four cultural patterns identified by Fiske match the four
types of patterns that emerge from I/C and V/H typology.HeC includes communal sharing and equality matching;
VeC, communal sharing and authority ranking; HeI, market
pricing and equality matching; and VeI includes market
pricing and authority ranking. However, it was not clear
from their conceptualisation whether Fiske’s four relational
models are the same as, correlates of, or elements in
a causal chain involving horizontal and vertical-individu-
alism and collectivism (Vodosek, 2003).
Earley (1997) provided a compelling argument that
clarifies the conceptual relationship between Triandis’s
(1995, 1996) cultural syndromes and Fiske’s (1991, 1992)
relational models. Earley (1997) argued for the necessity
of ‘meso’ style research in the area of cross-cultural
organisational behaviour. Meso research is characterised by
the study of the mechanisms by which variables from
different levels of analysis affect each other. Specifically,
Earley (1997, 1998) suggested that, culture as a societal or
organisational level variable affects individual level vari-
ables such as perceptions, values, or behaviour through
constructs that link the two levels. Earley (1998) proposed
that Fiske’s (1991, 1992) relational models may be such
a linking construct. In other words, the cultural ori-
entations of HeI, VeI, VeC, and HeC may get manifested in
individual behaviour through Fiske’s relational models.
Koerner and Fujiwara (2000) tested empirically the corre-
spondence between Triandis’s cultural syndromes and
Fiske’s relational models and found that the cultural
syndromes and the relational models correlated enough in
predicted ways to suggest that culture types may very well
be expressed in relational models in individuals’
psychology. This paper takes the perspective endorsed by
Earley (1998) and Vodosek (2003) that constructs such as
relational models may represent a mediating mechanism
between culture and individual or groupelevel processes.
Next, the taxonomy of supervisoresubordinate exchanges
is developed using Fiske’s relational models and Triandis’s
cultural syndromes. A summary of the typology is presented in
Table 1.
Supervisoresubordinate exchanges in HeI cultures
The primary relational models used in HeI cultures are
equality matching and market pricing. Equality matching
emphasises fairness and balance in social relations where
reciprocity among equals is stressed. It minimises the power
differential between subordinates and their supervisors, and
hierarchy in organisations means an inequality of roles
established for convenience. In their social exchanges,
subordinates expect their supervisors to consult them. The
ideal boss behaviours epitomise that of a ‘resourceful
democrat’. In market pricing, people voluntarily enter into
exchanges on often explicitly negotiated terms, paying as
little as possible based on their profit and loss calculations.
The employereemployee relationship is treated as
a contract. Self-interest is paramount and task consider-
ations prevail over relationship considerations.
Members in HeI cultures that predominantly combine
equality matching and market pricing want to be unique
and independent, not particularly interested in being
distinguished from others and do not seek high status
(Koerner and Fujiwara, 2000). Moreover, the tit-for-tat kind
Table 1 The nature of supervisoresubordinate exchanges across four cultural syndromes of horizontal-individualism, vertical-collectivism, vertical-individualism, and
horizontal-collectivism.
Horizontal-Individualism Vertical-Collectivism Vertical-Individualism Horizontal-Collectivism
Fiske’s relational
models used
Equality matching and market
pricing
Authority ranking and communal
sharing
Authority ranking
and market pricing
Equality matching and communal
sharing
Representative
national cultures
Australia, Denmark, Norway,
Sweden
China, Brazil, India, Japan, Korea France, Great Britain, US Israeli Kibbutz, New Zealand
Basic content of
supervisoresubordinate
exchanges
Tit-for-tat kind of exchanges
entailing similar value. Primarily
exchanges have an
instrument/rational basis.
Supervisors care, nurture, and
protect subordinates; subordinates
show loyalty, respect, obedience,
and gratitude.
Calculative,
achievement-oriented
subordinates defer
to the wishes of superiors
to secure resources;
supervisors reward
subordinates that advance
their self-interests and
power base. Exchanges
are instrumental/rational.
A strong sense of fairness among
equal status supervisors and subordinates
combines with intensely personal in-group
exchanges that reinforce group harmony
and cohesion. Exchanges involve
relational/emotional considerations.
Exchanges have a
relational/emotional basis.
Commonly observed
supervisor/subordinate
behaviours
Subordinates expect their
supervisors to consult them.
The ideal boss is a ‘resourceful
democrat’. Both supervisors
and subordinates want to be
unique and independent, not
particularly interested in being
distinguished from others.
The unequal distribution of power
results in asymmetric
supervisoresubordinate exchanges.
The ideal leader is a ‘benevolent
dictator’. Subordinate-supervisor
relationship is formal and distant.
Decisions are made unilaterally by
the boss. The relationship is
chiefly paternalistic, a coupling of
power (authority and hierarchy)
and relationships (emotions and
loyalty)
Supervisoresubordinate
exchanges are aggressive
and assertive. Proactive
influential tactics
and impression management
are common. Emphasis on
measured contributions as
the basis for rewards tempers
superiors’ wilfulness.
The supervisoresubordinate exchanges
are likely to be modest and silent. A good
boss is honest, direct, and cooperative.
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Supervisoresubordinate exchanges across cultures 75of exchanges between supervisors and subordinates in such
cultures are likely to entail exchanges of similar value.
Exchanges involving supportive leadership will be more
effective than directive leadership (Euwema et al., 2007).
The ‘Australian egalitarianism’ (Casimir & Waldman,
2007; Trevor-Roberts, Ashkanasy, & Kennedy, 2003: 523)
represents supervisoresubordinate exchanges characteris-
tics of HeI cultures. Market pricing and equality matching
dominant in HeI cultures create contradictions typified by
the ‘Australian enigma’ reported by Ashkanasy and Falkus
(1998). These authors found that Australian leaders need
to be performance-oriented in a society which values
achievement (consistent with individualism), but at the
same time need to do so in amanner which does not set them
too apart from their fellow organisational members
(consistent with horizontalness). Leaders who are seen to
over-perform are likely to find themselves in the position of
the ‘tall poppy’, ready to be cut down. Thus, it seems that
the high-quality supervisoresubordinate exchanges in
Australia are determined significantly by the implicit lead-
ership theories endorsed in the Australian culture that
emphasise achievement and equality (House et al., 2004). In
addition, the supervisoresubordinate exchanges in Danish,
Norwegian, and Swedish organisations emphasising an egal-
itarian culture are likely to be predominantly HeI type.
Proposition 1a. The supervisoresubordinate exchanges in
HeI cultures will make greater use of equality matching and
market pricing than authority ranking and communal
sharing.
Proposition 1b. The supervisoresubordinate exchanges in
HeI cultures will take place between more or less equal
individuals and entail instrumental exchanges of similar
value and kind.
Supervisoresubordinate exchanges in VeC cultures
VeC is opposite of HeI. According to Triandis (1995),
cultures or societies over time tend to converge toward
either HeI or VeC, and out of the four cultural syndromes,
VeC is, perhaps, the most common in the world. Asian
(including Far Eastern, South Asian, and Middle Eastern
countries), Latin American, African, and Communist coun-
tries in Eastern Europe are all predominantly VeC cultures.
The primary relational models used in VeC cultures are
authority ranking and communal sharing. Unconditional
giving, conformity, and strong in-group feelings are three
central features of communal sharing: people give without
expectations of what they will receive in return; conformity
results from identification and the desire to belong; inclu-
sion is binary e either you are in or you are out. When
authority ranking and communal sharing combine people
yield to the dictates of in-group leaders, show conformity
and allegiance to the in-group, willingly sacrifice their own
interests for in-group goals, and seek to maximise in-group
success in competition with out-groups. In such cultures,
people see themselves as members of in-group; however,
they see differences among group members, and status
inequality is expected (Koerner and Fujiwara, 2000). Thesupervisoresubordinate exchanges are likely to emphasise
hierarchy and relationships. The unequal distribution of
power between subordinates and supervisor results in an
imbalance in supervisoresubordinate exchanges suggesting
that the exchange may involve different things (e.g.,
protection from the supervisor and loyalty/obedience from
the subordinate) (Khatri, 2009). Because of the emphasis on
relationships in VeC cultures, supervisoresubordinate
exchanges in these cultures involve emotions and affect.
Supervisors care, nurture, and protect subordinates.
Subordinates, in turn, show loyalty, respect, and gratitude.
The ideal leader in VeC cultures is a ‘benevolent dictator’
(Pellegrini & Scandura, 2006).
Some paradoxical dualities exist in the superi-
oresubordinate relationships in VeC cultures (Aycan, 2006;
Pellegrini and Scundra, 2006; Sinha & Sinha, 1995). First,
there is high respect but also high affection towards the
superior. As such, there is an element of both love and fear
in this relationship. Second, being an in-group member, the
superior is considered as ‘one of us’, but being a person
with higher status, he or she is ‘unlike us’. Third, superiors
have close relationships with the subordinates and are
involved in all aspects of their lives, but this does not
translate into an informal ‘friendship’ relationship. Instead,
the subordinateesuperior relationship is formal and
distant.
The decision making process reflects the power
inequality (Aycan, 2006; Farh & Cheng, 2000; Holzinger,
Medcof, & Dunham, 2006; Khatri, 2009). The process is
usually centralised, and the decisions are made unilater-
ally. This is because the leaders do not want to relinquish
power by being participative. Subordinates also expect the
leader to be decisive, not only because they trust his or her
wisdom, knowledge, and competencies, but also because
they are afraid of taking risk and responsibility by getting
involved in the decision making process.
Many researchers have examined the super-
visoresubordinate exchanges for this syndrome. The chief
characteristic of the leaderemember exchanges in VeC
cultures is paternalism (Neal, Catana, Finlay, & Catana,
2007; Pellegrini & Scandura, 2008; Sinha & Sinha, 1995;
Uhl-Bien & Maslyn, 2005). Paternalism ‘combines strong
discipline and authority with fatherly benevolence’ (Farh &
Cheng, 2000: 91). Paternalism can be seen as the coupling
of power (authority and hierarchy) with relationships
(emotions and loyalty). In paternalism, managers take
a personal interest in the workers’ off-the-job lives and
attempt to promote workers’ personal welfare. Supervisors
assume the role of parents and consider it an obligation to
provide protection to their subordinates. Subordinates, in
turn, reciprocate the care and protection of the paternal
authority by showing loyalty, deference, and compliance.
The boundary between work and private life in super-
visoresubordinate exchanges blurs (Alston, 1989; Farh &
Cheng, 2000).
Alston (1989) explains the nature of paternalism in the
Korean culture. According to the author a key principle of
supervisoresubordinate relationship in the Korean culture
is inhwa. Inhwa stresses harmony between unequals in
rank, prestige, and power and requires subordinates to be
loyal to their superiors and superiors to be concerned with
the well-being of subordinates. The concept is derived from
76 N. KhatriConfucianism and suggests that a person owes total loyalty
to parents and authority figures. Workers owe their super-
visors the same loyalty they owe their parents and family
elders. Farh and Cheng (2000) proposed a model of pater-
nalism consisting of the three dimensions of authority,
benevolence, and morality in Chinese culture. Subordinates
in Chinese culture reciprocate their supervisor’s personal
authority, dominance, and control over them by being
obedient, compliant, and submissive, and the supervisor’s
favours and generosity by showing unwavering personal
loyalty and true-hearted gratitude toward him/her. In
a recent study, consistent with the idea of paternalism,
Chen et al. (2008) developed and validated three key
dimensions of the supervisoresubordinate guanxi in
Chinese organisations: affective attachment between the
supervisor and subordinate, personal-life intrusion by the
subordinate and boss into each other’s lives, and obedience
and devotion of the subordinate to the supervisor.
Proposition 2a. The supervisoresubordinate exchanges in
VeC cultures will make greater use of authority ranking and
communal sharing than equality matching and market
pricing.
Proposition 2b. In VeC cultures, supervisors will care,
nurture, and protect their subordinates in exchange for
loyalty, respect, and gratitude from them.
Supervisoresubordinate exchanges in VeI cultures
The underlying social relations in VeI cultures are authority
ranking and market pricing. In authority ranking, individuals
emphasise status differences and regard inequality as
natural. Lower ranking members show loyalty and respect to
their seniors through submitting to their wishes. When
market pricing and authority ranking combine, calculative,
achievement-oriented individuals aspire to higher status
through deferring to the wishes of superiors in an attempt to
secure resources. Market pricing’s emphasis on measured
contributions as the basis for reward tempers superiors’
wilfulness. In such cultures, people want to be distinguished
from others and seek high status through competition
(Koerner and Fujiwara, 2000). The supervisoresubordinate
exchanges are likely to mirror these underlying motivations
and tendencies. The advancement of self-interest lies at the
core of such exchanges (Yu & Liang, 2004).
It is only natural that the transaction cost economics
paradigmbased on opportunistic behaviour emerged in a VeI
culture (Chen et al., 2002). More generally, opportunism
refers to the incomplete or distorted disclosure of informa-
tion, especially calculated efforts to mislead, distort,
disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse. But its more
blatant form includes seeking self-interest with guile, lying,
stealing, and cheating. The transaction cost theory may
resonate in economic and management systems and institu-
tions in VeI cultures, but may be less applicable to economic
and management systems and institutions in collectivist
cultures. This is because self-interest or selfishness which is
central to transaction cost theory is a highly sanctioned
behaviour in collectivistic cultures. Similarly, the principal-agent theory based on self-interest does apply and makes
a lot of sense in a VeI economic system but may not be
a particularly useful framework to explain economic behav-
iour in collectivist cultures.
The high-quality supervisoresubordinate exchanges in
VeI cultures are likely to exist only if both parties are able
to recognise and advance each other’s interests and last as
long as both parties are ‘useful’ to each other, unlike the
supervisoresubordinate exchanges in collectivist cultures
that may last a lifetime, and even when the individuals are
no more with the same organisation (Aycan, 2006).
Goodwin, Bowler, and Whittington (2009), in their study of
a service organisation in the Southwestern United States,
a VeI culture, found the instrumental aspects of the
supervisoresubordinate exchanges as more vital and
enduring than relational aspects.
Aaker (2006) suggests that persuasion styles vary
between vertical and horizontal cultures. Thus, while the
supervisoresubordinate exchanges in HeI cultures are
likely to be modest and silent, they are likely to be
aggressive and assertive in VeI cultures. Proactive influ-
ential tactics identified in impression management litera-
ture fit supervisoresubordinate exchanges in VeI cultures
(Bolino, 1999). It appears that the LMX theory as formu-
lated in the United States is more applicable to individualist
cultures with moderate verticalness than other cultures
(Zhang, Song, Hackett, & Bycio, 2006).
Proposition 3a. The supervisoresubordinate exchanges in
VeI cultures will make greater use of authority ranking and
market pricing than equality matching and communal
sharing.
Proposition 3b. Supervisors and subordinates in VeI
cultures will be proactively engaged in task, utilitarian, and
self-interest based exchanges.
Supervisoresubordinate exchanges in HeC cultures
HeC cultures are less common and have received much less
research attention. The primary relational models used in
HeC cultures are equality matching and communal sharing.
Where these two models predominate, a strong sense of
fairness among equal status members combines with
intensely personal in-group exchanges that reinforce group
harmony and cohesion. Consequently, the super-
visoresubordinate exchanges in such cultures aremost likely
to emphasise equality and relationships. The super-
visoresubordinate exchanges in New Zealand as reported by
Trevor-Roberts et al. (2003) fit this cultural syndrome. The
authors reported an emic egalitarian leadership style in New
Zealand with emphasis on collectivistic (team-oriented)
leadership, unlike ‘Australian egalitarianism’ with emphasis
on individualism. The effective leaders in New Zealand were
reported to display effective etic leadership dimensions of
vision, performance-orientation, decisiveness, and integrity
in an emic style of team leadership. Consistent with the
cultural values of HeC, effective leadership in New Zealand
was found to stress honesty, directness, and cooperation
within a framework of assumed equality.
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HeC cultures will make greater use of equality matching
and communal sharing than authority ranking and market
pricing.
Proposition 4b. The supervisoresubordinate exchanges in
HeC cultures will have a relational (or emotional) basis
involving a strong sense of fairness among equal status
individuals.
Dysfunctions of close relationships between
supervisors and subordinates
The LMX theory assumes that the exchange process that
operates between supervisors and their subordinates is an
entirely functional and objective one, i.e., subordinates in
close relationships with their supervisors will be given
correspondingly greater benefits such as higher perfor-
mance ratings for their more effective and efficient
performance (Durate, Goodson, and Klitch, 1993; Graen &
Cashman, 1975). However, the findings from a sufficiently
large number of studies cast doubt on the purely functional
characterisation of the LMX theory (see Deluga & Perry,
1994; Durate, Goodson, and Klitch, 1993; Green et al.,
1996). For example, the ratings of poorly performing high
LMX employees were inflated by factors other than task
performance (Durate, Goodson, and Klitch (1993) and
interpersonal factors (non-functional attributes of high
LMX) increased the variance explained in subjective
performance ratings by as much as two times that
explained by ability, job knowledge, and task performance
(functional attributes of high LMX) (Borman, White, &
Dorsey, 1995). Subordinates were also reported to ingra-
tiate their supervisors by beguiling and uncritically
mimicking their position on important issues (Deluga &
Perry, 1994).
While close relationships between supervisors and
subordinates have clear benefits for the parties involved,
an unresolved ambiguity of their relationship with organ-
isational variables remains (Gerstner & Day, 1997). This
paper builds on the notion of cronyism proposed by Khatri
and colleagues (Khatri & Tsang, 2003; Khatri et al., 2006).
Khatri and Tsang (2003) illuminate the dynamics underlying
dysfunctional close relationships by explicitly recognising
political motives in social exchanges between supervisors
and their subordinates. However, the authors do not specify
how these close relationships vary across cultures. On the
other hand, Khatri et al. (2006) proposed a general
framework that portrays cronyism across cultures but does
not examine specifically how cronyism may occur in
supervisoresubordinate exchanges.
Khatri and Tsang (2003) define cronyism as favouritism
shown by the superior to his or her subordinate (e.g.,
promotion, bonus, pay raise, or better job assignment)
based on non-performance (e.g., relationship or liking of
subordinate by the supervisor) rather than performance
criteria (e.g., objective performance, competence, or
qualifications of the subordinate), in exchange for the
latter’s personal loyalty. In cronyism, an employee witha good performance loses out on a promotion or pay raise
because his or her superior favours another person on the
basis of that person’s relationship with and loyalty towards
the superior.
Khatri et al. (2006) distinguished between two types of
cronyism: instrumental and relational. Instrumental
cronyism is motivated primarily by task, utilitarian, and
self-interest based factors. Favours of comparatively equal
value are exchanged, with reciprocation taking place in
a relatively short time. Relational cronyism is motivated
primarily by relationship, affection, and loyalty-based
factors. Favours exchanged are not necessarily equal in
value, with the possibility of reciprocation for an extended
period of time. The authors suggested that instrumental
cronyism is more likely to occur in individualist cultures and
relational cronyism more likely to occur in collectivist
cultures. Further, cronyism is more likely to occur in
vertical than horizontal cultures. Verticalness creates
competition as well as imbalance in power, thus resulting in
higher cronyism. Horizontalness on the other hand,
provides checks and balances that help to prevent prefer-
ential treatment. For example, as a horizontally-oriented
culture, Denmark embraces a political ethos of equality
enacted by safeguards against authoritarian dictate (Nelson
& Shavitt, 2002). The emphasis on status in vertical cultures
propels intense competition for high prestige positions and
symbols. The notion in the United States of fulfilling the
American Dream through upward social mobility is an
example of a vertical value. The primacy of power
dynamics and acceptance of hierarchy reduces the chance
that any grievances raised by deprived parties will be taken
seriously by others (Davis & Ruhe, 2003; Husted, 1999). For
instance, in a pattern noted in U.S. organisations, a vertical
culture, superiors establish personal power bases by
granting favours such as fast promotion to subordinates in
exchange for cooperation and support (Hurley, Fagenson-
Eland, & Sonnenfeld, 1997).
In horizontal cultures, people higher up in the organisa-
tional hierarchymaynotbeperceivedasmuchdifferent from
those below other than having greater decision making
responsibility. Thus, showing loyalty and deference to
superiors for their patronage is not an attractive proposition
for subordinates. Superiors also are not keen on cultivating
loyal, obedient, and submissive subordinates as a means of
developing a personal power base within the organisation
because exercise of power for personal gain is detested.
The extent of overall cronyism is likely to be the highest
in VeC cultures and involves the relational form of
cronyism (Khatri et al., 2006). Empirical studies lend
support to a higher degree of cronyism in vertical cultures.
For example, Zhang et al. (2006) reported that, in the
Chinese workplace, a vertical culture, the quality of
the relationship with the supervisor was more central than
the subordinate’s actual performance, and results played
a lesser role than quality of one’s relationship with the
supervisor in influencing performance evaluations. Gomez,
Kirkman, and Shapiro (2000) found that Mexicans (vertical
collectivists) give more positive evaluations to in-group
members than to out-group members, even for identical
level of performance.
The wilfulness of supervisors in VeI cultures is somewhat
tempered because the supervisoresubordinate exchanges
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Srinivas (2005) studied supervisoresubordinates exchanges
in the US (VeI Culture) and India (VeC Culture) and found
that supervisors in the US sample were able to separate
their liking for a subordinate from actual performance
when assigning performance ratings. On the other hand,
ratings of low performers were consistently inflated by
raters with positive interpersonal affect towards them in
the Indian sample. In addition, because of the emphasis on
market pricing in social exchanges in VeI, both supervisors
and subordinates aggressively engage in instrumental,
short-term, self-interest maximising exchanges.
Proposition 5. The supervisoresubordinate exchanges in
VeC cultures involve the highest level of cronyism, which is
primarily relational or emotional in nature.
Proposition 6. The supervisoresubordinate exchanges in
VeI cultures involve the highest level of instrumental
cronyism.
Discussion and conclusion
There is rarely any management theory that has received
more criticism, both theoretical and methodological, than
the LMX theory, and yet failed to show any further devel-
opment and refinement over time (House et al., 2006;
Schriesheim et al., 1999). A careful reading of the
lacunae documented in the past research seems to suggest
the LMX theory may better be abandoned as it does not
enhance our understanding of supervisoresubordinate
exchanges in any meaningful manner (Dansereau,
Yammarino, & Markham, 1995; Yukl, 2006). This paper
provides a fresh perspective on supervisoresubordinate
exchanges. Using two sociological frameworks, Fiske’s
relational models and Triandis’s cultural syndromes, it
develops a taxonomy of supervisoresubordinate exchanges
across cultures.
A majority of the theories and debates in the manage-
ment literature, including the LMX theory, are based upon
ideas and data collected from the Western populations,
hence rooted in the Western cultural traditions and
perspectives. However, an overwhelming majority of the
world’s population lives outside the Western countries.
Given that humans have a basic ethnocentric orientation
(Triandis, 1996), it is important to capture practices from
non-Western cultures to develop valid and more inclusive
theories that explain management and organisational
phenomena in non-Western cultures. Thus, a cross-cultural
framework of supervisoresubordinate exchanges proposed
in this paper is both timely and necessary in an increasingly
global context.
The typical approach in international management is to
take a theory/measure developed in the United States and
use it to collect data elsewhere assuming that theories/
measures developed in the United States are equally
applicable elsewhere. However, such an approach seems
problematic in formulating more valid and generalisable
theories. A better approach may be to have a team ofscholars from various cultures to come together to build
new theories and measures. For example, to test and
further develop the taxonomy of supervisoresubordinate
exchanges proposed in this paper, it would be ideal to have
scholars who come from each of the four cultural
syndromes of VeI, VeC, HeI, and HeC. The exchange of
ideas among scholars from the four cultures would help in
building a more valid and useful theoretical cross-cultural
framework of supervisoresubordinate exchanges. Such
a framework is likely to be more effective in identi-
fying both universal and unique elements of super-
visoresubordinate exchanges.
Qualitative studies are usually more promising in the
theory building stage. Once the ideas get clearer and more
specific, quantitative studies can ensue in refining the
theory further. Thus, to test and elaborate the nature of
supervisoresubordinate exchanges proposed in this paper,
semi-structured interviews with supervisors and their
subordinates in the four cultural syndromes may be a good
starting point. Brainstorming through focus groups also
seems appropriate.
Gerstner and Day (1997), in their meta-analytic review
of LMX theory, reported a mean correlation of .29 between
leader and member reports of LMX quality, which seems
rather small for a relationship that is purportedly dyadic.
The low correlation between supervisor and subordinate
reports of their relationship is indicative of a significant
perception gap. It may be that supervisors and subordinates
are using different mental models in their social exchanges.
According to Fiske (1991; 1992), in order to get along with
people and function effectively one has to coordinate with
other members of the group using the same relational
models they are using in the same ways. If one does so,
there is going to be a lot of trust and strong relationships
and the social life of the individual will work very well. The
application of relational theory to supervisoresubordinate
exchanges would suggest that, in high-quality LMXs, the
supervisoresubordinate dyad is likely to use the right
combination of relational models and, in low-quality LMXs,
the wrong combination of relational models.
The question naturally arises as to why high-quality
exchanges may involve the right combination of relational
models and low-quality exchanges the wrong combination
of relational models. Triandis’s four cultural syndromes,
VeI, VeC, HeI, and HeC, provide an answer to this ques-
tion. While these syndromes are used to distinguish
cultures, individuals are capable of using all four patterns
in all cultures (Triandis, 1996). Thus, one way to think of an
individual’s personality is to construct a profile of these
syndromes. For example, an individual might have a profile
such as this one: 10% VeC, 30% VeI, 5% HeC, and 55% HeI.
The other individual may have a profile that looks like this:
55% VeC, 5% VeI, 30% HeC, and 10% HeI. These two indi-
viduals use contradictory relational models in their social
exchanges, one using predominantly HeI type exchanges
and the other using predominantly VeC type exchanges. If
these two individuals consist of a supervisor and a subordi-
nate, they are highly unlikely to develop high-quality
exchanges. A significant perceptual gap will also be pre-
dicted because the two individuals approach the exchange
differently and may diverge in their expectations from the
exchange.
Supervisoresubordinate exchanges across cultures 79Relational models and cultural syndrome can explain
what may make bicultural or multicultural individuals
(individuals with significant exposure to two or more
cultures) more effective in operating in different cultural
environments. With significant exposure to various cultural
syndromes, bicultural or multicultural individuals come to
appreciate better what relational models may be more
appropriate in a particular culture. For example, interna-
tional students, mostly from developing countries with
a vertical collectivist orientation, get a cultural shock when
they first arrive in the United States. It lasts at least a couple
of years. With a collectivist orientation, they find it hard
to understand the behaviour of individualist Americans.
As individualists, Americans use market pricing in their
exchange process, but Asians being collectivists use
communal sharing in their exchanges, thus creating misun-
derstandings. Similarly, the Indian students in Australia find
it hard to adapt since the Australians are horizontal indi-
vidualist. They de-emphasise hierarchy and even under-
graduate students address their teachers by their first name,
whereas Indian students often use ‘sir’, which Australians
find funny. However, international students, after significant
exposure to the new culture are able to use the appropriate
exchange mechanism. Since cultural values are deeply
ingrained, it becomes hard to behave in an opposite fashion
to one’s own cultural value to be correct in the new culture.
The earlier that an individual is able to ‘switch’ to the new
way, the more adapted he or she is in the new culture, thus
experiencing less of a cultural shock.
This paper has provided explanation of super-
visoresubordinate exchanges across four cultural
syndromes quite broadly. It is possible to find cultures or
nations or societies or geographical regions within
a cultural syndrome that may show subtle differences
across them. For example, this paper describes the pater-
nalistic leadership that is commonly observed in vertical
collectivist cultures. However, research shows that the
nature of paternalism in India is likely to be somewhat
different from Korea, China, or Turkey. With further
empirical research, these nuances can be understood much
more clearly.
Cronyism underlies many unethical behaviours in orga-
nisations (Khatri et al., 2006; Khatri & Tsang, 2003). Thus,
many close relationships between supervisors and their
subordinates can potentially lead to unethical behaviour.
For example, recently, Altman et al. (2008), in a study of
Chinese enterprises, reported unethical behaviour resulting
from the supervisoresubordinate guanxi. Specifically, the
authors found that subordinates use ingratiation, pseudo
loyalty, pseudo citizenship, and false pretence for
authority for developing a high level of guanxi with their
supervisors. The organisations in VeC and VeI cultures
need to pay attention to such close relationships between
supervisors and subordinates and put in place management
practices that can effectively counter them.
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